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s every lawyer knows,
the prosecutor is the
most powerful figure
in the American criminal justice system.
The prosecutor decides whom to charge, what
charges to bring, whether to permit
a defendant to plead guilty, and
whether to confer immunity. In
carrying out this broad decisionmaking power, the prosecutor enjoys considerable independence.
Indeed, one of the most elusive and
vexing subjects in criminal justice
has been to define the limits of the
prosecutor's discretion.
This issue has recently emerged
in a new context: the provisions in
the Federal Sentencing Guidelines
(the Guidelines) relating to sentence reductions based on the
prosecutor's representation that a
defendant has given law enforcement substantial cooperation. In
Mistretta v. United States, 109 S Ct
647 (1989), the Supreme Court upheld the Guidelines against constitutional attacks based on separation
of powers and delegation of authority. However, the Court was not
asked to consider other constitutional challenges-in particular the
claim that the Giridelines violate
due process by de facto transferring much of the responsibility of
sentencing from impartial judges to
prosecutors, without providing
standards to guide the prosecutors'
discretion. Indeed, according to
one federal court, the enhanced
prosccutorial power under this new
sentencing regime "may be the
most fundamental change in the
criminal justice system to have occurred within the past generation."
(United States v. Roberts, 726 F Supp
1359, 1363 (DC DC 1989).)
The Guidelines were designed to
effectively stunt the wide discretion that district judges formerly
enjoyed i n criminal sentencing.
(United States v. LaCuardia, 902 F2d
1010, 1013 (1st Cir 1990).) Indeed,
uniformity in the sentences imposed on similar offenders co11victed of like crimes was a primary
goal of Congress in enacting the
Gt~ideliries.(United States v. Agui-
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lar-Pena, 887 F2d 347 ( I st Cir 1989);
United States v. White, 869 F2d 822,
825 (5th Cir 1989).) Although they
remove sentencing discretion from
judges, the Guidelines tacitly shift
much of that discretion to prosecutors. Thus, the most important
provisions that permit sentence reduction below a statutorily mandated minimum-18
U.S.C. §
3553(e) and Guideline SKI .l-reoognize as a mitigating factor the defendant's efforts to assist the
government in the investigation and
prosecution of criniinal activities.
18 U.S.C. 5 3553(e), entitled
"Limited authority to impose a sentence below a statutory minimum," provides:
Upon motion of the Government, the court shall have the
authority to impose a sentence
below a level established by statute as minimum sentence so as
to reflect a defendant's substantial assistance in the investigation
or prosecution of another person
who has committed an offense.
Such sentence shall be imposed
in accordance with the guidelines and policy statements issued by the Sentencing Commission pursuant to section 994 of
Title 28, United States Code.
Section 5K1.1 of the
Sentencing Guidelines, entitled
"Substantial Assistance to Authorities (Policy Statement)," provides:

Upon motion of the governmelit
stating that the defendant has
provided substantial assistance in
the investigation or prosecution
of another person who has committed an offense, the court may
depart from the guidelines.
(a) The appropriate reduction
shall be determined by the
court for reasons stated that
may include, but are not limited to, consideration of the
following:
( I ) the court's evaluation of
the significance and usefulness of the defendant's
assistance, taking into consideration the government's evaluation of the

assistance rendered;
(2) the truthfulness, completeness, and reliability
of any information or testimony provided by the
defendant;
(3) the nature and extent of
the defendant's assistance;
(4) any injury suffered, or any
danger or risk of injury to
the defendant or his family
resulting from his assistance; and
(5) the timeliness of the d r fendant's assistance.
The interpretation and application of these provisions raise several fundamental questions. First,
by removing the court's authority
to reduce a sentence except upon
the prosecutor's motion, do Section 3553(e) and Guideline 5K1 .I
violate due process? Second, assuming the foregoing provisions are
constitutional, does a defendant
have any remedy when a prosecutor refuses to move for a sentence reduction based on the
defendant's claim that he or she
gave substantial cooperation?Third,
assuming a court is willing to entertain the application, what standards should be applied to review
a prosec~~tor's
exeicise of discretion in refusing to request a sentence reduction based o n the
defendant's purported cooperation?

Constitutionality of
and SK1.1?

5 3553(e)

Under the Guidelines, the prosecutor has broad power to unilaterally control the amount of
punishtnent a defendant receives.
Under the strict language of the
statute and Guidelines, unless the
prosecutor initiates the process,
neither the defendant nor the court
can influence a sentence by showing that the defendant cooperated
with the government. The prosecutor alone is empowered to cause
a sentence to be adjusted below the
mandated minimum, and the judge,
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who historically has been the principal official entrusted with responsibility for sentencing, becomes
virtually obsolete. To be sure, even
absent a prosecution motion, the
court is free to consider evidence
of a defendant's substantial assistance in determining what sentence
within the guideline range should
be imposed. (LaCuardia, 902 F2d at
1013, n 4.) Nevertheless, the process, so the argument goes, tips so
one-sidedly in the prosecutor's favor as to "disturb the due process
balance essential to the fairness of
criminal litigation." (Roberts, 726 F
Supp at 1363.)
This new sentencing regime has
resulted from two factors. First, in
its charging function, the prosecution can select the precise charges
to bring against a defendant from a
broad arsenal of often overlapping
criminal statutes and aggravating
factors enumerated in the Guideline provisions. For example, if a
person is arrested in possession of
two ounces of crack, the prosecutor may have a discretionary choice
among the following thirteen statutory options: simple possession
of crack (21 USC 5 844: statutory
punishment one year); possession
with intent to distribute crack (21
USC § 841(a): twenty-year maximum); possession with intent to
distribute 5 grams or more of crack
(21 USC 3 841(b)(l)(B)(iii):five-year
mandatory minimum, which can be
doubled at prosecutor's option if
defendant is charged with distribution to persons under the age of
twenty-one, or within 1,000 feet of
a school); possession with intent to
distribute 50 grams or more of crack
(21 USC § 841(b)(l)(A)(iii):ten-year
mandatory minimum to life); conspiracy (18 USC § 371: five-year
maximum); drug conspiracy involving the distribution of 5 grams or
more of crack (21 USC §
841(b)(l)(B)(iii): five-year manda-
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tory minimum); drug conspiracy involving the distribution of 50 grams
or more of crack (21 USC 53
841(b)(l)(A)(iii) and 846: ten-year
mandatory minimum to life); engaging in a pattern of racketeering
(18 USC §§ 1962(a), 1963: twentyyear maximum); conspiracy to engage in a pattern of racketeering (18
USC § § 1962(d), 1963: twenty-year
maximum); engaging in a continuing criminal enterprise (21 USC §
848: ten-year mandatory minimum
to life); use of a firearm in aid of
drug trafficking (18 USC 5 924(c):
five-year mandatory minimum; ten
years if the weapon is a machine
gun); use of juveniles (21 USC 5
845(b): one-year minimum); drug
trafficking by one previously convicted of a similar drug offense (21
USC § § 841(b)(l)(A) and (B), (iii):
ten-year mandatory minimum to
life if 5 grams or more; twenty years
to life if 50 grams or. more).
Second, the mandatory sentencing laws and Guidelines have purposely produced relative inflexibility with respect to the sentence.
Thus, once the prosecutor has decided on the charges, the judicial
contribution, in many cases, can be
almost ministerial. Since the prosecutor is able to make a very precise selection of the ultimate sentence, the judge's role is simply to
ratify the choice of sentence determined by the prosecutor.
Under this system the potential
for sentencing disparities-purportedly the vice that the Guidelines sought to eliminate-has
merely been shifted from the province of the judge to that of the
prosecutor. Indeed, by charging
and bargaining in disparate ways
with similarly situated defendants,
the prosecutor is able to introduce
as much sentencing disparity into
the system as he or she chooses.
Furthermore, although judge-made
disparities are open to public scrutiny, prosecutor-made disparities
are decided in secret, without any
public oversight.
On the other hand, the Supreme
Court observed in Mistretta that
"the sentencing function long has
been a peculiarly shared responsi-

bility among the Branches of government and has never been
thought of as the exclusive constitutional province of any one
Branch." (109 S Ct at 664.) Moreover, Congress may, if it chooses,
eliminate all discretion from sentencing and make every sentence
mandatory. (Id at 650-51.) If Congress can remove all discretion, can
it not guide that discretion through
the Guidelines?(White, 869 F2d at
825.) Furthermore, since there is no
constitutional right to individualized sentencing (Lockett V. Ohio,
438 US 586, 602 (1978)), a defendant has no right to present mitigating evidence to the sentencing
authority (United States v. Huerta,
878 F2d 89 (2d Cir 1989); United
Ith
States v. Musser, 856 F2d 1484 (I
Cir 1988); United States v. White,
supra). Therefore, a defendant cannot complain if that evidence is
regulated in the form provided by
the Guidelines. Finally, according
to some courts, the prosecutor's
power is not really as formidable as
the due processclaimsuggests. Said
one court: "The only authority
'delegated' by the rule is the authority to move the district court for
a reduction of sentence in cases in
which the defendant has rendered
substantial assistance. The authority to actually reduce a sentence
remains vested in the district
court." (Musser, 856 F2d at 1487.)

Remedies for prosecutor's
refusal to move for reduction
The language of 18 U.S.C. §
3553(e) and Guideline 5K1.1 requires a motion by the prosecutor
before a court may reduce the defendant's sentence based on the
defendant's cooperation. Most
courts have construed this requirement strictly: Without the triggering motion by the prosecutor, a
court may not consider the defendant's cooperation. (United States
v. Rexach, 896 F2d 710 (2d Cir
1990); United States v. Francois, 889
F2d 1341 (4th Cir 1989); United
States v. Weidner, 703 F Supp 1350
(ND Ind 1988).) Some courts have
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construed this requirement more
broadly to include a prosecutor's
oral recommendationat the time of
sentence (United States v. Campbell, 704 F Supp 661, 663 (ED Va
1989)), or letters to the court detailing the defendant's cooperation
(United States v. Coleman, 707 F
Supp I 101 (WD Mo 1989)).Absent
a downward departure motion by
the prosecutor or its functional
equivalent, what remedy is available to a defendant who seeks a
sentence reduction based on substantial assistance?
As noted above, some courts
squarely hold that absent a motion,
no remedy is available regardless of
the unreasonableness of the prosecutor's refusal. (See Rexach, Francois, and Weidner, supra.) Considerable judicial deference is-and
should be-accorded to prosecutorial discretion, particularly in view
of the prosecutor's expertise.
However, a total withdrawal of the
judicial function is potentially dangerous. Occasions may arise when
prosecutorial discretion should be
reviewable. For example, what if a
defendant makes a colorable
showing that the prosecutor's refusal to make a downward-departure motion was based on racial or
vindictive grounds? Surely judicial
intervention in such a case would
not only be appropriate, but would
even be mandated.
Some courts, while suggesting
that prosecutorialdiscretion may be
reviewable, refuse to consider
claims of abuse by pointing out that
the prosecutor already has exercised discretion through beneficial
charging or plea bargaining decisions. For example, the prosecutor
already may have selected a lesser
charge from a wide variety of possible charges with varying mandatory minimums, or may have
permitted a plea to an even further-reduced charge. A court
therefore could conclude that the
defendant already received the
benefit of his or her cooperation
during the charging and plea-bargaining phase of the case and is not
entitled to any further prosecutorial lenity. (United States v. La-

Cuardia, supra; United States v.
lustice, 877 F2d 664 (8th Cir 1989);
United States v. Taylor, 868 F2d 125
(5th Cir 1989); United States v. Nelson, 717 F Supp 682 (DC Minn
1989).)
Finally, some courts have held,
for differing reasons, that in appropriate cases a prosecutor's motion
is not a necessary precondition for
a sentence reduction based on the
defendant's cooperation. (lustice,
White, and Roberts, supra.) In these
instances, the courts provide a
remedy either by finding the statute and Guidelines unconstitutional (United States v. Curran, 724 F
Supp 1239 (CD 111 1989); Roberts,
supra); by reading into the cooperation agreement a downwarddeparture condition (Coleman, supra); by applying 18 U.S.C. 5
3553(b), which allows for "an aggravating or mitigating circumstance of a kind, or to a degree, not
adequately taken into consideration by the Sentencing Commission," to find as an aggravating
circumstance prosecutorial bad
faith (United States v. Bruno, 897
F2d 691, 695 (3d Cir 1990); or by
simply announcing that the provisions in the statute and Guidelines
do not mean what they say Uustice
and White, supra).

Standard for evaluating
prosecutorial discretion
Assume that a prosecutor has
made a decision not to move for a
downward departure based on the
defendant's cooperation. What
standard should a court employ to
determine whether the prosecutor
acted in good faith?The only court
to squarely address this important
question has been the Second Circuit in United States v. Rexach, 896
F2d 710 (2d Cir 1990). In Rexach,
the defendant was indicted for selling three vials of cocaine to an undercover officer within 1,000 feet
of a public elementary school, and
for possessing with inteni to distribute cocaine. (21 USC S S 812,
841, and 845.) Rexach participated
in a proffer session with an Assis-

tant United States Attorney.
A proffer session ordinarily occurs before any cooperation agreement is reached. At the proffer session, a representative of the United
States Attorney's Office, defense
counsel, and the client meet to discuss the kinds of assistance that the
client might be able to render. An
agreement is executed containing
the understanding that no statements made at the proffer session
may be used by the government
against the client in any future
prosecution, except in a prosecution for false statements, obstruction of justice, or perjury. Furthermore, the government may use
information derived directly or indirectly from the meeting to obtain
evidence against the client and may
also use statements made by the
client for the purpose of cross-examination, should the client testify.
At the proffer session, Rexach
provided detailed information that
led to the arrests of three individuals. However, he provided no further information until one week
before his trial, when he claimed
that he could offer additional information about large-scale narcotics
dealers and distributors. Based on
these representations, the government entered into a cooperation
agreement with Rexach which provided that Rexach would cooperate fully, attend meetings, and
testify for the government. The
agreement further provided:

If it is determined by this Office
that Domingo Rexach has made
a good faith effort to provide
substantial assistance in the investigation or prosecution of another person who has committed
an offense, this Office will file a
motion * * * pursuant to Title 18,
United States Code, Section
3553(e) so that the sentencing
judge shall have the authority to
impose a sentence below a level
established by statute as a minimum sentence, and * * * pursuant
to Section 5K1.1 of the Sentencing Guidelines. (Rexach, 896 F2d
at 712.)
Pursuant to this agreement, Rexach pleaded guilty to distributing
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cocaine. Before sentencing, the
government informed Rexach that
it would not move for a downward
departure because it did not find
that he had made a good-faith effort to provide substantial assistance. Rexach's information, according to the government, was
"unreliable and worthless." He offered no assistance in investigating
the information, failed to stay in
contact with the authorities, and
dropped out of sight for significant
periods of time. Claiming that the
government had breached the
agreement, Rexach moved for an
order directing specific performance. (Rexach also claimed that
section 5K1.1 violated due process
and the separation of powers doctrine because it conditioned a
downward departure on a prosecutor's discretionary determination
of substantial cooperation. The
Second Circuit rejected those arguments in a subsequent decision,
United States v. Huerta, supra.)
The district judge denied the
motion for specific performance,
finding that the prosecutor had
made a good-faith determination
that Rexach had not provided substantial assistance. (United States v.
Rexach, 713 F Supp 126 (SD NY
1989).) The district judge imposed
a sentence of fourteen months' imprisonment, midway in the guideline range of twelve to sixteen
months; a six-year period of supervised release; and a special assessment of $50. A panel of the Second
Circuit affirmed, with one judge
dissenting. Recognizing that its recent decision in United States v.
Huerta (supra) contained broad
language suggesting that a prosecutor's discretion in making downward-departure motions might be
unlimited and unreviewable, the
court sought to clarify the appropriate standards governing a prosecutor's refusal to make such a
motion. Specifically, should the test
be whether the prosecutor subjectively believed that the defendant
failed to provide substantial assistance, or should the prosecutor's
subjective belief also be objectively reasonable?

Fall 1990

Initially, absent any cooperation
agreement, the decision by a prosecutor to forgo a downward-departure motion "is not subject to
judicial review at all." (Rexach, 896
F2d at 713.) Thus, no matter how
unreasonable or in bad faith the
prosecutor's decision may be, absent any cooperation agreement,
there is no judicially enforceable
obligation to move for a downward
departure, just as there is no judicially enforceable obligation on the
prosecutor to engage in plea bargaining. However, when a cooperation agreement is entered into,
a court will review that agreement
and the parties' obligations under
it, pursuant to established principles of contract law. (Santobello v.
New York, 404 US 257 (1971);
United States v. Carbone, 739 F2d
45 (2d Cir 1984).) Thus, where the
agreement is conditioned on the
satisfaction of the obligor-the
prosecutor, in this case-the condition is not met if the obligor is
honestly, even though unreasonably, dissatisfied.
In Rexach the cooperation agreement left acceptance of the defendant's performance subject to the
prosecutor's judgment; therefore,
the prosecutor was allowed to reject the defendant's performance,
provided the prosecutor was honestly dissatisfied. Indeed, observed
the court, the Guidelines themselves adopt a broad subjective
standard for prosecutorial decision
making. Under the Guidelines, the
prosecutor decides whether to
make a downward-departure motion, what constitutes "substantial
assistance," and how the court
should evaluate that assistance.
"For these reasons, the decision to
make or withhold a motion for
downward departure must be given the same high level of deference as other prosecutor decisions." (Rexach, 896 F2d at 713.)
There are, the court noted, some
limits on the prosecutor's exercise
of discretion. First, there is an implied obligation of good faith in
every contract (Restatement (Second) of Contracts S 205), as there
is in other areas of prosecutorial
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decision making. (United States v.
Wayte, 470 US 598 (1985); Blackledge v. Perry, 41 7 US 2 1 (19741.1
Although a prosecutor is presumed
to act in good faith, this presumption can be rebutted by showing
that the prosecutor acted invidiously, vindictively, or in bad faith.
(id.) Second, a defendant could negotiate a cooperation agreement
that provided for a standard of satisfaction to be one of objective reasonableness. Finally, as a matter of
policy, prosecutors would not be
likely to misuse cooperation agreements and risk that as defendants
came to distrust prosecutors, valuable information would not be
forthcoming. (See also United States
v. lewis, 896 F2d 246, 249 (7th Cir
1990); United States v. LaCuardia,
902 F2d at 1O f 6.)
Judge Pierce, in dissent, did not
disagree that the absence of a cooperation agreement precludes judicial review, nor that agreements
are reviewed under ordinary contract principles. He did disagree,
however, with the application of
those principles to this case-specifically, the failure of either the
majority or the district judge to determine whether the parties contemplated that Rexach's earlier cooperation pursuant to the proffer
agreement would be included in
the "substantial assistance" calculation. Judge Pierce further noted
that objective standards frequently
are employed to interpret pGrformance promises in contracts. (See A.
Corbin, Corbin on Contracts 5 150
at 670 (1963).) Thus, applying an
objective standard, Rexach's assistance-providing information leading to three arrests-constituted
"substantial assistance" within the
meaning of the plea agreement.
Judge Pierce would have remanded the case to the district court to
determine whether the parties intended that Rexach's earlier assistance would be included within the
"substantial assistance" calculus.
The Second Circuit's broad deference to prosecutorial discretion
under the Sentencing Guidelines is
not surprising. The judiciary histor(Continued on page 43)
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Sentence Reduction
(Continued from page 7)
ically has shown remarkable restraint when reviewing prosecutorial decision making generally. (See
Bennett Cershman, Prosecutorial
Misconduct 5 4.1 (Clark Boardman
1985).) Even so, as a practical matter, reviewing prosecutorial discretion under a subjective bad-faith
test is meaningless. Cases that apply a bad-faith standard to prosecutorial behavior have rarely found
against the prosecutor. (See B.

Gershman, supra; United States v.
Smitherman, 889 F2d 189, 191 (8th
Cir 1989): threatening to intervene
if prosecutor arbitrarily and in bad
faith refuses to file a SKI .1 motion.)
Rexach is a prime example of arguably bad-faith conduct by the
prosecutor. Although Rexach provided information leading to the
drug arrests of three persons, the
Second Circuit sustained the prosecutor's claim that the assistance

was not substantial enough. Finally,
the Second Circuit's confidence
that institutional incentives guarantee prosecutorial good faith may
be fanciful. After Rexach, it is probably more likely that cooperating
defendants will be reluctant to enter into cooperation agreements
with prosecutors without much
more meaningful assurances than
simple reliance on the prosecutor's
good faith.
(3

